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Presidential Inability:
The Problem and a Solution
It is urgent that the problem of Presidential inability be solved now,
Mr. Feerick declares. After outlining the problem and noting Presi-
dential inabilities in the past, he endorses the consensus proposal for
a constitutional amendment worked out by the panel of experts con-
vened by the American Bar Association in January and later adopted
by the House of Delegates as the proposal of the Association.
by John D. Feerick * of the New York Bar (New York)
THE SHOCKING DEATH of Presi-
dent Kennedy stunned the American
people and revived a problem which
is as old as the nation itself. The
contrast between what actually hap-
pened on November 22, 1963, and
what could have happened has jolted
us into the realization that the problem
of Presidential inability must be solved
once and for all.
Senator Kenneth B. Keating of New
York has stated:
As distasteful as it is to entertain
the thought, a matter of inches spelled
the difference between the painless
death of John F. Kennedy and the
possibility of his permanent incapaci-
ty to exercise the duties of the highest
office of the land.1
Because President Kennedy died,
there was a swift and orderly transfer
of power. Had he lived seriously in-
jured, however, chaos and confusion
might well have invaded the United
States Government. No one would
have been clearly authorized by the
Constitution either to determine the
inability of the President or to make
a major decision had one been neces-
sary.
The Problem Arises
from the Constitution
The Constitution is singularly vague
on the subject of Presidential inabili-
ty. It neither defines inability nor
provides a method of determining the
commencement or termination of in-
ability. It merely provides that:
In Case of the Removal of the Presi-
dent from Office, or of his Death,
Resignation, or Inability to Discharge
the Powers and Duties of the said
Office, the Same shall devolve on the
Vice President, and the Congress may
by Law provide for the Case of Re-
moval, Death, Resignation or Inabili-
ty, both of the President and Vice
President, declaring what Officer shall
then act as President, and such Offi-
cer shall act accordingly, until the
Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.2
The wording of this clause poses a
fundamental problem: What devolves
on the Vice President? Is it the office
of President or the powers and duties
of the office? If it is the office which
devolves, the Vice President would
presumably become President, and
thus in a case of inability the dis-
placed President could not recover the
office upon cessation of the inability.
If it is the powers and duties which
devolve, the Vice President would
merely act as President for the dura-
tion of the inability. It is clear,
though, that whatever devolves does
so in all cases-removal, death, resig-
nation and inability.
It is evident from the records of
the proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention that the Founding Fa-
thers thought they had handled the
problem adequately by providing for
a temporary substitute for the Presi-
dent in all cases. In no event did
they intend the Vice President to be-
come President.3 The debates at the
convention are not at all revealing,
however, as to what inability is or
who determines it. It is very probable
that the word "inability" was intended
to cover any occurrence which would
cause a President to be unable to dis-
charge the powers and duties of his
office.
1. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Amendments of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1964) (hereafter cited as 1964 Senate
Hearings).
2. U.S. CoNsT. art. It, 1, cl. 6.
3. See SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION (1951)
and the author's recent article, The Problem
of Presidential Inability-Witt Congress Ever
Solve It?, 32 FORDHAIS L. REV. 73 (1963).
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A persuasive argument was made
by Henry E. Davis in 1881 that the
reason for the Constitution's silence
on these questions is that "the con-
vention thought the provision as
adopted self-explanatory, self-operative
and sufficient". 4 He believed, as do
most authorities, that the Constitution
implicitly gives the Vice President the
power to make the determination of
inability when the President is unable
to do so.
Tyler's Succession
Set a Precedent
The first application of the succes-
sion provision occurred on the death
of President William Henry Harrison
on April 4, 1841-the first death of a
President in office. The then Vice
President, John Tyler, asserted his
right to the office and title of Presi-
dent and became President for the re-
mainder of Harrison's term. Former
President John Quincy Adams ex-
pressed the objection of many at the
time when he stated:
[I]t [Tyler's assumption of the ti-
tle and office of the Presidency] is a
construction in direct violation both
of the grammar and context of the
Constitution, which confers upon the
Vice President, on the decease of the
President, not the office but the pow-
ers and duties of the said office.
The so-called Tyler precedent has
been followed in turn by Vice Presi-
dents Millard Fillmore, Andrew John-
son, Chester A. Arthur, Theodore
Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, Harry S.
Truman and Lyndon B. Johnson. Be-
cause of this interpretation that the
office devolves on the Vice President
when a President dies, confusion has
resulted on each occurrence of Presi-
dential inability in our history. This
has been due mainly to the fear that
were a Vice President to take over, he
would become President for the re-
mainder of the term, since whatever
devolves does so in all cases. Doubt
as to whether the Vice President has
the constitutional authority to declare
the President disabled has added to
the confusion.6
On July 2, 1881, President Garfield
was shot by Charles T. Guiteau and
for the next eighty days he lingered
between life and death, clearly unable
to discharge the powers and duties of
the Presidency. Several weeks after
the shooting, the Cabinet met and
unanimously agreed that Vice Presi-
dent Arthur should assume the re-
sponsibilities of the Presidency. A
majority of the Cabinet believed, how-
ever, that if he did so, he would be-
come President for the remainder of
the term. Arthur refused to act as
President for fear that he would be
labeled a usurper. The crisis ended
on September 19, when Garfield died
and Arthur succeeded to the Presi-
dency. During his term of office, he
expressed deep concern over the ques-
tion of Presidential inability and re-
peatedly asked Congress to solve the
problem. But nothing was done.
On September 25, 1919, an illness,
which was followed by a stroke on
October 2, rendered President Wood-
row Wilson incapable of discharging
the powers and duties of the Presi-
dency and another inability crisis pre-
sented itselfj While Wilson lay ill,
many insisted that Vice President
Thomas R. Marshall act as President.
For fear that he would oust the Presi-
dent if he did so, Marshall, like Ar-
thur before him, declined.
Some twenty-eight bills became law
by default of any action by the Presi-
dent. Few public matters reached
Wilson and he was seldom seen dur-
ing the remainder of the term. Mrs.
Wilson, Dr. Grayson and other mem-
bers of the White House staff admin-
istered executive affairs. Wilson did not
call a Cabinet meeting until April 13,
1920. In the interim, the Cabinet met
unofficially, largely under the direc-
tion of Secretary of State Robert
Lansing. When Wilson learned of
these meetings, he forced Lansing to
resign, believing Lansing was plotting
to oust him. This series of events
provoked renewed discussion of the
problem, but again Congress failed to
take any action.
4. Davis, Inability of the President, S. Dec.
No. 308, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1918).
5. 10 ADAMS, MEMOIS Or JOHN QUiNCY ADAMS
463 (1876).
6. ". . ITihe history of 170 years shows no
real difficulty attends the determination of
when or whether a President is unable to per-
form the duties of his olice. The crux of the
constitutional problem has been and will be to
ensure that the Vice President can take over
with unquestioned authority for a temporary
period when the President's disability is not
disputed, and that the President can resume
his office once he has recovered." 1964 Senate
On September 24, 1955, President
Eisenhower was stricken with a heart
attack and the gap in the Executive
forcibly presented itself once again.
The problems confronting the country
at that time were such that, as the
President himself said, he "could not
have selected a better time, so to
speak, to have a heart attack...s
The government was administered
by a small group of officials pursuant
to policy directives previously formu-
lated by the President. Former Vice
President Nixon has remarked:
The committee system worked dur-
ing the period of President Eisenhow-
er's heart attack mainly because ...
there were no serious international
crises at that time. But had there
been a serious international crisis re-
quiring Presidential decisions, then ...
the committee system might not have
worked 9
Mr. Eisenhower's ileitis attack on
June 8, 1956, and the stroke causing
a speech impairment on November 25,
1957, again served to point up the
constitutional inadequacies in relation
to Presidential inability.
Congressional hearings were held
by both the House and Senate Judi-
ciary Committees and every aspect of
the subject was thoroughly examined.
There was general agreement that
something should be done, but wide-
spread disagreement as to the best
method for determining a President's
inability was manifest. Numerous
proposals were offered. None, how-
ever, commanded enough support to
be adopted.
Informal Agreements
Mr. Eisenhower's illnesses prompt-
ed him to make a historic agreement
with his Vice President, Richard M.
Nixon, in 1958.10 This was the first
act of any real significance in meeting
the inability problem. The agreement
provided that in case of his inability
the President would inform the Vice
Hearings (remarks of former Attorney Gen-
eral Herbert Brownell).
7. See generally, HANSEN, THE YEAs WE HAD
No PReSIDENT 29-42 (1962) and the recent
book, SMITH, WHEN THE CHEERING STOPPED
(1964).
8. EISE'.s nOv, MANDATE FOR CHANGC 545
(1963).
9. Transcript of television broadcast, CBS
Reports: The Crisis of Presidential Succession
17 (January 8, 1964) (remarks of former Vice
President Nixon).
10. White House press release, March 3,
1958.
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President, who would then act as
President until the inability ceased. If
the President should be unable to
communicate with the Vice President,
the Vice President, after such consulta-
tion as seemed appropriate, would
make the decision to act as President.
In either event, the President would
determine when the inability had end-
ed and at that time would resume the
full exercise of the powers and duties
of his office. This precedent was fol-
lowed by President Kennedy and Vice
President Johnson in 1961, and more
recently by President Johnson and
Speaker McCormack.
A penetrating objection to this type
of solution was made by Mr. Nixon
when he said:
[lit would not be effective in the
event you happened to have a Presi-
dent and Vice President who didn't
get along. . . .The President might
not want to write *a letter. If he had
written one, he might tear it up. Let's
suppose, for example, that the Presi-
dent became disabled and that the
Vice President decided that he should
step in and assume the duties of the
Presidency, but ...a member of the
President's family held a Cabinet po.
sition or some other high post and
didn't believe that the President was
so disabled. . . . You'd have a consti-
tutional crisis there of great magnitude.
. . . We just can't have this great
government of the United States run
in that way, by the whims and the
personal reactions of whoever may be
Vice President, or President, or the
wife of the President at a critical
time.11
Perhaps the main reason for the
continuing failure to solve this prob-
lem on a permanent basis has been
the difficulty in finding a solution that
would be practical and widely accept-
ed. Experience indicates that there is,
in fact, no perfect solution. But this
is not to say that there is no workable
solution. As Senator Keating noted:
"The best we can hope to achieve is
the best practical solution which will
meet the needs of crises we can readi-
ly envision."12
Conference Produces
a Workable Solution
The most workable solution yet pro-
posed, in my opinion, was advanced
in January, 1964, by a special panel of
lawyers called together by the Amer-
ican Bar Association. The group in-
cluded a former Attorney General of
the United States, a former Deputy
Attorney General, past, present and
future Presidents of the American Bar
Association, professors of law and prac-
ticing lawyers. 13 The members of the
group represented a variety of points
of view regarding the question of how
to solve the problem.14 The group
spent two days in closed session ex-
amining the various proposals.
At the close of its session, it issued
a consensus which has since been en-
dorsed by the American Bar Associa-
tion and other groups. 15 The consen-
sus is necessarily a compromise, but
it represents points on which a group
of persons who had studied the prob-
lem could agree. They are:
1. A constitutional amendment is
necessary.
2. The amendment should state
that in a case of inability, the powers
and duties of the Presidency devolve
on the Vice President for the duration
of the inability, while in the case of
death, resignation or removal, the of-
fice of President devolves for the rest
of the term.16
3. The amendment should also spe-
cifically state that (a) the President
may declare his own inability in writ-
ing; (b) if a President is unable or
unwilling to make such a declaration,
the Vice President, with majority ap-
proval of the Cabinet' 7  (or such
other body as Congress may by law
determine) may make the determina-
tion; and (c) the President may re-
sume his powers and duties upon his
own declaration in writing, except
that if the Vice President and a ma-
jority of the Cabinet do not agree that
the President is able to resume them,
the Vice President shall continue to
act and Congress shall review the dis-
11. CBS Reports, op. cit. sUpra note 9, at 18
(emphasis added).
12. 1964 Senate Hearings.
13. They were: Herbert Brownell, Walter
E. Craig, Paul A. Freund. Jonathan C. Gibson,
Richard H. Hansen, James C. Kirby, Jr., Ross
L. Malone, Charles B. Nutting, Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., Sylvester C. Smith, Jr., Martin
Taylor, Edward L. Wright and the author.
14, The conferees "differed widely in their
views just as individual Senators probably do.
But they all agreed that the dire necessities of
promptly solving the problems outweighed
their individual preferences," 1964 Senate
Hearings (remarks of Herbert Brownell).
15. "Although there was not absolute agree-
A graduate of Fordham College
(B.S. 1958) and of Fordham Law
School (LL.B. 1961), John D.
Feerick practices in New York
City. A student of the Presiden-
tial inability problem, he testified
recently before the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments of
the Senate Judiciary Committee.
agreement. A two-thirds vote of both
houses of Congress shall be required
to keep the President from resuming
his powers and duties.
4. An amendment should provide
that whenever a vacancy occurs in the
Vice Presidency, the President shall
nominate a person who will, upon con-
firmation by Congress, become Vice
President.
There were several reasons why an
amendment was considered necessary.
Some members of the panel were of
the opinion that Congress has no pow-
er at all to legislate on this subject-
that it merely has the power to legis-
late on the line of succession beyond
the Vice Presidency. Most believed
that the Vice President now has the
constitutional power to determine in-
ability and, therefore, this power
ment by each conferee on all points of the
final consensus, there was general agreement
on the statement," 1964 Senate Hearings
(remarks of Walter E. Craig). For the text
of the explanatory statement and consensus of
the conference, see 50 AB.A.J. 237 (1964)
The House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association adopted the principles of the con-
sensus at its Midyear Meeting in February,
1964. See 50 A.B.A.J. 393 (1964).
16. The panel's recommendations concerning
the Vice President were made equally appli-
cable to whoever would be first in the line of
succession.
17. The term "Cabinet" means the "heads
of the executive departments".
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could not be diverted from him, con-
stitutionally, by legislation. It was
stressed that if a merely legislative so-
lution to the problem were enacted, it
would be subject to constitutional
challenge, which would come, very
likely, during a time of inability-
when we could least afford it.
The second point would eliminate
the fear that a Vice President would
oust the President if he acted as
President in a case of inability, and it
would give constitutional status to the
Tyler precedent.
The panel believed that the Vice
President should be involved in the
decision, since it is his duty to act as
President and he should, therefore,
have a voice in determining when so
to act. On the other hand, it was felt
that he should not have the sole pow-
er, as he would be an interested party
and, therefore, reluctant to make a de-
termination. The Cabinet was thought
to be the best possible body to assist
him in making the determination.
Among the reasons for the selection of
the Cabinet were that its members are
close to the President, that they would
likely be aware of an inability, that
they would know whether the circum-
stances were such that the Vice Presi-
dent should act, that they are part of
the Executive branch, and that the
public would have confidence in their
decision. A primary consideration in
favor of a so-called Vice President-
Cabinet approach was that it would
involve no violation of the principle
of separation of powers, which is fun-
damental to our system of govern-
ment.
An insertion of a specific method in
the Constitution itself was decided on
for several reasons. The amendment
would be self-executing and would re-
quire no further legislation by Con-
gress. Since the Constitution is quite
specific as to the election of the Presi-
dent and as to how he may be de-
prived of his powers and duties by
impeachment, the method of determin-
ing inability, which would also de-
prive him of his prerogatives, at least
temporarily, should be no less specific
and should be written into the Con-
stitution.
Giving Congress a broad power to
establish a method for determining
inability is in itself no solution, for a
method would still have to be agreed
upon by Congress-and that could
take years. The inclusion of a pro-
vision that Congress could change
the Cabinet as the body to function
with the Vice President was recom-
mended. Although some members felt
that Congress should have no power
at all to change the method, it was
the consensus that such a provision
would have the advantage of flexibili-
ty, so that if it should become neces-
sary to do so, Congress could by legis-
lation (which would be subject to
Presidential veto) change the proce-
dure relatively quickly without hav-
ing to resort to a new constitutional
amendment.18
The possibility of a President's de-
claring that he was able when he was
not led to the inclusion of the provi-
sion that the Vice President and a
majority of the Cabinet could prevent
him from doing so. The Vice Presi-
dent would continue to act in order
that the office would not be filled by
one whose capacity was seriously chal-
lenged. A two-thirds vote of Congress
would be required to prevent the Pres-
ident from resuming his powers and
duties, in order to weigh the provision
heavily in favor of the President. This
also conforms to the two-thirds vote
required by the Constitution to re-
move a President from office. It was
stressed that since the President is
elected by all the people, he should
not be deprived of his powers and
duties except under extraordinary cir-
cumnstances.
The panel was unanimous that the
best way to solve the succession prob-
lem is by filling the Vice Presidency,
since the Vice President, having been
chosen and trained for that purpose,
is the official in the best position to
succeed to the Presidency. 19 The
manner of filling the vacancy would
give the President a dominant role.
However, as Congress would provide
a check, it would be in conformity
with current practice and would in-
sure that the Vice President would be
of the same party as the President
and compatible with him.
Now Is the Time
for Congress To Act
The consensus offers a very practi-
cal solution to the problem of Presi-
dential inability. Without further leg-
islation, it is complete, practical and
consistent with the principle of sepa-
ration of powers. It gives the decisive
role to those in whom the people most
likely would have confidence. It in-
volves only persons who have been
elected by the people or approved by
their representatives, and it embodies
checks on all concerned-the Presi-
dent, the Vice President and the Cabi-
net. Finally, since it would be em-
bodied in a constitutional amendment,
there would be no question about its
constitutionality.
It is urgent that the problem of
Presidential inability be solved now,
while the tragedy of November 22,
1963, is still fresh in our memory. 20
To miss this opportunity and again to
leavc unsolved this most serious prob-
lem would be to trifle with the se-
curity of this great nation. As Senator
Keating, who has been deeply con-
cerned over the problem for many
years, said: "Let us not lose the op-
portunity to take action on inability
by losing inability proposals in the
scramble for changing the succession
law." 2 1
In the words of Senator Birch Bayh
of Indiana., Chairman of the Sen-
ate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments: "Our obligation to deal
with the question of Presidential in-
ability is crystal clear."'22
18. Thus, the consensus in effect combines
provisions of S. J. Res. 139, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (Senator Bayh and others) and S. J.
Res. 25, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (Senator Keat-
ing).
19. The rationale for this recommendation
was well stated by the American Bar Associa-
tion Committee on Jurisprudence and Law
Reform: ". . . [It is] essential in this atomic
age that there always be available a Presi-
dential successor who would be fully con-
verssnt with domestic and world affairs and
who would be prepared to step into the higher
office on short notice and to assume its full
responsibilities with a minimum of interrup-
tion of the conduct of affairs of state." See
the author's article, The Vice Presidency and
the Problems of Presidential Succession and
Inability, 32 FoimAw L. Rzv. 457 (1964).
20. "Presidential inability is, to be sure, a
delicate and distasteful subject to contemplate
but in all prudence it must be faced." 1P64
Senate Hearings-(remarks of Professor Paul
Freund)." . . [Slurely the time has come
when reasonable men must agree on one
workable method." Id. (remarks of Lewis F.
Powell, Jr.)
21. Id.
22. Id.
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